ABSTRACT: When a small business purchases a capital asset (e.g., a vehicle), its cost for tax purposes is spread out over the useful life of the asset through the process of depreciation. It has become common for policy makers to liberalize depreciation rules in an effort to increase the level of business investment in a less-costly manner than across-the-board marginal tax rate cuts. However, little is known about the actual effects of depreciation policies on small business activity. We use a 12-year panel of tax returns for Schedule C sole proprietors to estimate a series of multivariate models to explain sole proprietors' decisions to remain in business as functions of their financial, demographic, and tax situations, including measures of the present discounted value (PDV) of a stream of tax deductions for depreciated capital under various rule structures. Discrete choice results suggest that increases in the PDV of tax reductions from depreciation (e.g. depreciating more of the value earlier in the recovery period) might actually lead to higher probabilities of exit for small businesses. Survival analysis of spells of small business activity confirms this result for single filers but not for married filers. Throughout our analysis, we are unable to find evidence that favorable depreciation rules are linked to greater rates of entrepreneurial longevity among Schedule C sole proprietors.
Introduction
Small business investment is vastly important to the overall health of the US macroeconomy. As small businesses represent the majority of employers and a very large share of US output, their purchasing decisions often drive the growth of the entire economy, especially during recessionary periods. When a small business purchases a capital asset such as a vehicle or a factory, its cost for tax purposes is spread out over the useful life of the asset through the process of depreciation. Additionally, small businesses can often treat capital purchases as current expenditures, subtracting the entire purchase price (subject to a legal limit) in the first year under Section 179 expensing rules.
Given the importance of small business investment, depreciation policy has become an active area for targeting tax breaks toward small businesses in recent years. Indeed, a highlight of the 2003 tax reforms from a small business perspective was a limited-time increase in Section 179 expensing allowances and a temporary acceleration of allowable depreciation deductions.
This "bonus depreciation" policy was intended to reduce the cost of investment in such things as vehicles and equipment, as part of a broad effort to stimulate the US economy during the slow growth that followed the 2001 recession.
The clear intent of more liberal depreciation rules is to increase the level of business investment. Such policy changes as increases in the Section 179 expensing limit and bonus depreciation are viewed as more directly-targeted tax breaks, especially for smaller businesses.
In a sense, they represent a way to reduce the tax burden on small businesses that is less costly in terms of reduced tax revenue than something more general like across-the-board marginal tax rate cuts. There is empirical evidence indicating that investment activity does respond to depreciation policy, as would be theorized, in general (see Hall and Jorgenson, 1967 , for seminal work in the area) and in response to the 2003 tax reforms previously mentioned (House and Shapiro, 2008) . One might wonder, however, whether the policies actually increase the long-run level of small business investment and activity, or merely cause existing small businesses to simply speed up purchases they would have otherwise made. Furthermore, another concern might be whether depreciation-related investment incentives might encourage small businesses to put questionable investments in place prematurely, which could possibly lead to the failure of some small firms. Thus, the overall effect of depreciation policy on the long-run longevity of small businesses is theoretically ambiguous and requires empirical investigation.
Perhaps as a result of the relatively short history of significant depreciation policy changes and the resulting data limitations, though, very little is known about the actual effects of depreciation policies on small business activity. We know of no prior study that has focused specifically on small business effects, although Knittel (2005) documented the use of the 2003 bonus depreciation and found that the policy tended to cause filers to claim larger deductions, but did not necessarily bring many more new filers into the depreciation deduction sample.
As researchers and policymakers continue a national debate on prospects for federal tax reform, certain forms of which would greatly affect the cost of capital faced by small businesses (e.g., by allowing all capital assets to be expensed rather than depreciated over time), it is important for researchers to gain a better understanding of the effects of depreciation policies on small business activity. This report provides such an investigation of the extent to which small business longevity hinges on attractive depreciation rules. 1 Unfortunately, little data exist on small business activity and depreciation deductions.
Large-scale surveys typically do not include important details regarding an entrepreneur's finances. With this data constraint in mind, we use a 12-year panel of individual tax return data, which includes indicators of small business activity as well as depreciation deductions taken on Schedule C by sole proprietors. The time period of our panel, 1979-1990, spans two major changes in US depreciation policy. This permits us to harness the exogenous rule changes to investigate entrepreneurial sensitivity to depreciation policy.
Our goal is to investigate the extent to which changes in depreciation rules during the 1980s were connected with changes in entrepreneurial longevity. Toward this end, we estimate a series of multivariate empirical models to explain sole proprietors' decisions to remain in business as functions of their financial, demographic, and tax situations, including measures of the present discounted value (PDV) of a stream of tax deductions for depreciated capital under various rule structures.
We focus on transitions around 1981 and 1986, when large-scale changes to federal depreciation policies were implemented. Specifically, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 introduced a new and vastly different depreciation regime, the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS). Depreciation policy was altered significantly a second time during the period of our analysis by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 which ushered in the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS). Paralleling these major changes in depreciation rules were increases in Section 179 expensing limits. Consequently, entrepreneurial responses to the policy changes during the 1980s will help us predict responses to more recent and future changes.
We begin with a brief overview of the history of depreciation rules under the US Federal Individual Income Tax. Next, we lay out our econometric approach and describe the data. We then discuss the various results of our analyses before concluding with a discussion of their policy relevance.
not necessarily imply failure, as discussed by Headd (2003) .
Depreciation Policy Since the Early 1980s
We begin by briefly summarizing depreciation policy before 1981 and then we review each of the two major depreciation systems that were implemented in 1981 and 1986, respectively.
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Once a useful life and a salvage value were reached, taxpayers depreciated their assets based on some IRS-approved depreciation method.
It is important to review the way in which depreciation allowances were calculated before the introduction of the ACRS system to understand the reasons behind its introduction. Historically, depreciation policy in the United States was based largely on "individual facts and circumstances." That is, individuals estimated the useful life of their assets in the industry they were employed and also the salvage value of their assets. Not surprisingly, administration of this system required a great deal of examination on the part of the IRS to ensure the accuracy of the useful life and salvage value estimates.
3 Accelerated Cost Recovery System (1981 System ( -1986 . ACRS moved depreciation policy to a uniform depreciation system for all taxpayers, completely eliminating depreciation deductions Over time, Congress gradually abandoned the individually-tailored system in favor of a system that was more uniform, in large part to reduce compliance and administration costs. By 1971, Congress had placed in effect the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR), which provided significant limitations on the allowable range of asset lives but still lacked complete uniformity across taxpayers.
2 For additional background on US depreciation policy, see Brazell, Dworin and Walsh (1989) , Brazell and Mackie (2000) , US Department of Treasury (2000), Gravelle (2001) , and Cohen, Hansen, and Hassett (2002) . 3 Taxpayers could choose among several IRS-approved methods. Here we describe two of the most common methods for illustrative purposes, the straight-line and double declining balance methods. Under the straight-line method, the taxpayer claims an equal depreciation deduction in each year of the recovery period. For example, for a $100 asset with a five-year recovery period, the depreciation deduction would be $20 each year. Under the doubledeclining balance method, the taxpayer takes twice the allowance of straight-line depreciation in the first year (40 percent for a five-year asset). In the second year, the taxpayer applies the deduction percentage from the first year (40 percent) to the initial asset value less the first-year deduction ($100 -$40 = $60) for a total second-year deduction of $24 (0.4 * $60) in our example. Under the most common variant of the double-declining balance method, the taxpayer would switch to the straight-line method in the year in which the straight-line deduction is greater than the double-declining balance deduction. He would then maintain the straight-line method thereafter tailored to "individual facts and circumstances." In addition, ACRS greatly simplified the depreciation system, placing all depreciable assets into one of six categories, each with a certain period over which to fully depreciate the asset, called a class life. This compares to 125 class lives under the system in place for the 1980 tax year. For the most part, ACRS accelerated the time over which assets would be depreciated (i.e., it shortened asset class lives) relative to earlier policy. Most assets were assigned a class life of three, five, or ten years, while real estate was given a longer recovery period. This effectively raised after-tax profits, and therefore had the potential to stimulate economic growth, a primary purpose of the legislation.
ACRS generally allowed use of the 150-percent declining balance method in calculating depreciation, compared to the earlier systems that allowed for the taxpayer to choose among several IRS-approved methods for the most part.
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Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (1987-) . While MACRS is fundamentally similar to ACRS, it brought about several significant changes to depreciation streams that could have significantly affected small businesses. First, MACRS introduced two additional class lives for most assets and a few more class lives for real estate. Second, under MACRS, some assets were reclassified into different class lives. For example, automobiles were classified as five-year property under MACRS whereas they had been three-year property under ACRS. An additional significant change with MACRS is that assets may only take appropriate depreciation for onehalf of a year in the initial year and one half of a year in the final year whereas ACRS applies the ACRS further simplified depreciation policy by eliminating salvage values and simply assuming a salvage of zero. This change, of course, eliminated a significant point of contention between taxpayers and the IRS.
(this would happen in the fourth year in our example).
half-year convention only to the first year. This extends the overall depreciation time, requiring a three-year asset to be depreciated over four tax years (i.e., by claiming one half-year of depreciation in the first year, one full year in the second and third year each, and the last halfyear in the fourth year).
Given the complexity of specific depreciation allowances under the ACRS and MACRS systems, it is useful to consider two examples of how the PDV of the stream of tax benefits from depreciation deductions would differ under the two systems for (a) the most common group of assets (five-year property) and (b) a specific asset (an automobile) that is likely to be of particular importance to small businesses.
The differences regarding five-year property between the two systems arise from a switch from a 150-percent declining balance method to a 200-percent declining balance method and the changes in timing of the deductions as noted above. The ACRS depreciation rates are 15 percent for the first year, 22 percent for the second year, and 21 percent for each of the remaining three years. This compares to the MACRS depreciation rates of 20 percent, 32 percent, 19.2 percent, 11.52 percent, 11.52 percent, and 5.76 percent for the first through sixth years respectively.
Using a simple discount rate of 10 percent and assuming the representative taxpayer is taxed at a constant 25 percent tax rate, these systems yield PDVs of the stream of tax reductions due to depreciation deductions for a $10,000 investment of $1,875 under ACRS and $1,933 under MACRS. Essentially, MACRS increased the PDV of the tax benefits from an asset's stream of depreciation deductions by about three percent. It should be noted, however, that the introduction of MACRS was accompanied by significant reductions in marginal tax rates as part of TRA86. The combination of MACRS and lower tax rates resulted in an overall reduction in the PDV of the stream of tax benefits from depreciation.
For our second example, recall that automobiles were reclassified from three-year class lives under ACRS to five-year class lives under MACRS. Here, of course, the PDV of the tax benefits from depreciation deductions for automobiles is the same as in the above example under the MACRS system. The depreciation rates for ACRS three-year property are 25 percent, 38 percent, and 37 percent for years one through three respectively. Under the same assumptions as in the above example, and again assuming a $10,000 initial value for the automobile, the PDV of the stream of tax reductions from depreciation allowances would be $2,048 under ACRS, compared to $1,933 under MACRS. Contrary to our first example, the change in depreciation rules for automobiles embodied by the move from ACRS to MACRS represented a 5.6 percent decrease in the present value of the stream of tax benefits from the depreciation deductions. The accompanying tax rate cuts only exacerbated this effect.
Later Policies. While our analysis is only able to consider decisions made within the timeframe of the depreciation systems discussed above due to data constraints, our estimates of Alongside this temporary bonus depreciation were large increases in Section 179 expensing limits. As noted, Section 179 permits businesses to treat capital expenditures, which would normally be depreciated for tax purposes, as current expenses. Businesses may simply subtract the full cost of a qualifying asset (up to the statutory limit) from gross receipts in calculating taxable income. Taxpayers were originally permitted to expense up to 20 percent of an asset's cost up to maximum of $20,000. This was repealed in 1981. From 1982 to 1986, the Section 179 limit was $5,000. It was increased to $10,000 as part of TRA86 and remained at that level until 1993 when it was again increased to $17,500. The most dramatic increase in the Section 179 limit occurred in 2003, when the limit was raised from $25,000 to $100,000. In a sense, they represent a way to reduce the tax burden on small businesses that is less costly in terms of reduced tax revenue than something more general like across-the-board marginal tax rate cuts. Perhaps as a result of the relatively short history of significant depreciation policy changes and the resulting data limitations, very little is known about the actual effects of depreciation policies on small business activity. We know of no prior study that has focused specifically on small business effects. With that, we now turn to an empirical investigation using our 12-year panel of individual tax records. Specifically, we examine the extent to which small business exit rates (as determined by the filing of a Schedule C in one year but not the next) respond to changes in depreciation rules during 1980s.
Data and Empirical Methodology
Data for our empirical analysis are drawn from the University of Michigan Tax In examining exit rates just after key changes in depreciation rules, note that the exit rate declined in 1981 and 1982 just after the introduction of ACRS, and declined only slightly in Page 12 1987 before rising in 1988 following the introduction of MACRS. Many other things were changing around these key years, however, so Figure 1 only provides suggestive evidence of an effect of depreciation rules on small business longevity. Our more detailed analysis explores the extent to which these changes in exit rates are directly attributable to changes in depreciation rules, controlling for other key determinants of entrepreneurial longevity.
Ideally, we would be able to examine the actual stream of annual depreciation deductions taken by sole proprietors in an attempt to separate the effects of rule changes on the level of investment from effects on the timing of investment. Unfortunately, our tax panel only includes the amount of depreciation claimed on Schedule C for tax years from 1986 to 1990.
Nonetheless, these data can provide additional evidence regarding the effects of changes in depreciation rules on entrepreneurial activity.
As shown in Figure 2 , the percentage of Schedule C filers claiming a deduction steadily declined from 46 percent in 1986 to 38 percent in 1990. The average dollar value of the depreciation deduction (among those claiming a deduction) also declined from about $5,300 in 1986 to just under $4,000 in 1990. These trends are almost certainly related to the reduction in the tax value of depreciation deductions inherent in the switch from ACRS to MACRS.
Earlier research on small business survival using tax return data has found key differences for single and married filers. For example, Bruce and Gurley (2005) found that entrepreneurial exit rates tend to be higher among single filers. We should not be surprised by these differences. For one, single filers tend to be younger and have larger variations in income and fewer dependents. All of these might serve to increase single filers' willingness to undertake risk relative to married filers. Conversely, a possible lack of credit history might make single filers more liquidity-constrained, potentially increasing the likelihood of exit for those who do become entrepreneurs. For these and other reasons, we conduct all remaining analyses separately for married and single filers.
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In the spirit of Bruce and Gurley (2005) , we estimate two different types of econometric models. First, we estimate discrete choice models where we specify our dependent variable as the value of one for those who exit their Schedule C sole proprietorship between years t-1 and t and zero for those who do not exit. 6 An initial look at entrepreneurship spells among those in the data is provided in Table 1 .
Note that limiting the sample to those who were in the panel for all 12 years and did not switch marital status results in a sample of 184 single filers and 1,065 married filers who make a total of 142 and 829 exits, respectively. The Kaplan-Meier Survivor Function provides an estimate, based on the data, of the probability of surviving beyond each time period (Kaplan and Meier 1958) . Note that filers in the data have only about a fifty-percent chance of "surviving" beyond their fourth year.
Second, since spells of entrepreneurial activity are typically short (a median length of 3 to 4 years in our data) and since we are able to observe many entire episodes of entrepreneurship from start to finish, we are able to follow Taylor (1999) in estimating duration models. This enables us to estimate the probability of exit from an entrepreneurial activity given that exit has not yet occurred, focusing on the entire spell rather than separate year-by-year transitions. This approach represents an important advantage over discrete-choice approaches that are not able to fully account for the conditional nature of recurring entrepreneurial longevity decisions.
5 Specifically, married includes those whose filing status is married or married filing separately, and single includes returns filed as unmarried (single), head of household or widowed. 6 We estimate a random effects model as in Bruce and Gurley (2005) . Given our lack of detailed demographic data, the individual-specific, time-invariant random effect should capture household characteristics, such as education level, that are not likely to change over time. Also note that there does not exist a sufficient statistic to calculate fixed effects in this context. Correspondingly, we are unable to conduct a Hausman specification test.
Our key explanatory variable in all multivariate models is the PDV of the stream of tax benefits from depreciation deductions for a given investment. This captures the tax benefits of depreciation rule changes that may affect small business activity. We rely on the above example that described the difference in the PDV of the tax benefits of depreciation deductions for property that originally cost $10,000 that was assigned a five-year class life under both ACRS and MACRS. This five-year class life includes a substantial portion of all property and will, accordingly, provide a significant insight into depreciation policy. Figure 3 presents average PDV by marital status from 1981 to 1990. In general, PDV was decreasing prior to 1986, but at a much faster rate for married filers, leading to a convergence in PDV for single and married filers. After 1986, PDV values were fairly stable with an uptick in for single filers in 1988.
To more broadly capture the policy changes between ACRS and MACRS, we perform additional analyses with the PDV of the stream of tax benefits from depreciation deductions for three-year property. 7 We calculate the PDVs of future tax benefits of depreciation allowances using the actual marginal tax rates individuals face in future years. By doing this, we are essentially assuming perfect foresight regarding marginal tax rates.
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Control Variables. We include several control variables to help explain the probability that a tax filer would remain in a sole proprietorship versus transitioning into the wage-andsalary sector. Among these are two expected marginal tax rates, following Bruce and Gurley
The present value calculations all assume a ten-percent discount rate. This overall structure enables us to (a) assess the direct importance of depreciation rules for entrepreneurial longevity, both qualitatively and quantitatively, and (b) perform simulations based on more recent changes in depreciation rules. 7 As with five-year property in the earlier example, the comparison here is only relevant for property that was assigned a three-year class life under both ACRS and MACRS. 8 We repeated all analyses with alternative PDVs which were calculated using a constant marginal tax rate, defined as the sole-proprietor's actual marginal federal income tax rate in the first year of the property's life instead of the (2005) . The first is the expected marginal tax rate in the wage sector if an individual exits the small business and the second is the expected marginal tax rate in the entrepreneurial sector if they do not exit. Both of these tax rates are combined tax rates for federal and state income taxes and the federal payroll tax. For the chosen outcome, we use actual income and tax return information to estimate the tax rate with the NBER TAXSIM model.
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Bruce and Gurley (2005) found that the above tax rates are endogenous in the entrepreneurial exit decision process. We address endogeneity here by using the same instrumental variable approach applied by Bruce and Gurley (2005) and Bruce (2000 and 2002) .
This approach uses exogenous changes in the federal tax code to construct instrumental variables for the tax rates. We construct a separate instrumental variable for each of the two (wage and entrepreneurship) tax rates, and these instrumental variables are entered separately into two firststage panel regressions, one for each potentially endogenous tax rate. Fitted values from these two first-stage regressions are used in our duration models and transition probits below.
For the alternative (nonchosen) outcome, we first estimate income before estimating the tax rate with other tax return details left unchanged.
We also include a dummy variable to denote the presence of at least one age 65 deduction on the tax return. This is the only indicator of taxpayer age on individual income tax returns.
We control for liquidity constraints via a dummy for the presence of a deduction for mortgage interest. To account for variations in household size and financial obligations, we include counts of the number of dependent children living at home, the number of dependent children living actual tax rate individuals faced in later years. This specification did not result in substantial differences from our baseline approach. 9 TAXSIM is a highly detailed tax calculator made available by the National Bureau of Economic Research. It uses limited information from survey data or other sources to estimate tax rates. Federal tax rates can be estimated for tax years back to 1960, and state tax rates can be estimated for tax years back to 1977. The user supplies as much detail as possible in the required data fields, and all other necessary inputs are estimated using historical data. The TAXSIM model is accessible at http://www.nber.org/taxsim. For more details, see Feenberg and Coutts (1993 Table 2 presents results from random effects probit models to explain the probability that an individual or married couple remain in a sole proprietorship. Separate results are shown for single and married filers and for PDVs using three-year and five-year property as discussed above. Results indicate that a larger PDV of the stream of tax benefits from depreciation allowances actually increases the likelihood that single and married entrepreneurs will exit their Schedule C sole proprietorships. In particular, a $100 increase in the PDV of tax benefits for depreciation allowances increases the probability of exit by 0.9 or 1.0 percentage points for single filers, depending on whether the analysis is based on three-or five-year property.
Results and Discussion
Compared to an overall exit probability of 23.5 percent, this represents a 4.3 percent increase in the probability of exit. For married filers the effect is smaller. A $100 increase in the PDV of tax benefits for depreciation increased the probability of exit by 0.1 percentage points or by about 0.6 percent.
additional details on the methods used in this paper, see Bruce and Gurley (2005) . 10 In addition to categorical variables to denote residence in the West, Midwest, or Northeast, we also include "Other" and "Missing." Other refers to Guam and similar places outside the 50 states and DC. Missing denotes that the place of residence was removed from the dataset because the tax return had adjusted gross income above Upon first glance, these results run counter to the notion that more generous depreciation provisions increase small business profitability and enhance the probability of survival.
However, a higher PDV could indicate a higher expected tax rate or more depreciation in the early years of the recovery period. In our analysis, we hold tax rates constant and apply a constant discount rate so that a higher PDV indicates that the filer receives more of the depreciation tax benefit in the first couple of years. This can increase the probability of exit because a sole proprietor does not need to stay in business longer to get the tax benefits. For example, when more of the tax benefits are available in later years, it increases the opportunity cost of exiting because one forgoes more of the tax benefit.
A less savory interpretation of these findings is that attractive depreciation policies encourage entrepreneurs to (a) make questionable investments or (b) to make good investments earlier than they should be made, both of which can unfortunately lead to premature closure of the business. Another more favorable interpretation is that sole proprietors who benefit from improvements in depreciation policy are more likely to exit by incorporating or otherwise successfully moving out of the ranks of the Schedule C sole proprietorships. While our data do not permit reliable examination of these possibilities, we view this as a critical area for future research.
Additional results in Table 1 indicate that tax rates have expected effects. An increase in the tax rate that an entrepreneur would face in the wage sector (upon exiting the small business)
reduces the probability of exit, while an increase in the tax rate he or she would face as an entrepreneur increases the probability of exit. These results are consistent across both single and married filers and echo Bruce and Gurley (2005) .
$200,000.
Being age 65 or older decreases the probability of staying in an entrepreneurial venture for single filers but has the reverse affect for married individuals. Small business exit probabilities are also found to vary by region of residence.
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To take a different look at the influence of depreciation rules on small business exit probabilities, we repeat the analysis for only the transition between 1986 and 1987, when MACRS replaced ACRS. We replace our key depreciation variable with the individual-specific difference in the PDV of tax benefits from depreciation deductions between ACRS rules and MACRS rules. A positive value of this variable indicates a reduction in the PDV while a negative value indicates an increase in the PDF.
The presence of a mortgage interest deduction increases the probability of exit for both single and married filers. Furthermore, having more children at home reduces the probability of entrepreneurial survival for single filers but does not affect married filers. More risk-averse filers, as indicated by a smaller balance due on their tax return, are more likely to exit a small business activity. Perhaps unsurprisingly, our results are highly robust to the measure of the PDV of depreciation-related tax benefits using three-year property versus five-year property.
This allows us to focus exclusively on the years surrounding the exogenous change in depreciation rules, but costs us in terms of reduced sample sizes. In fact, we are unable to report results for single filers due to a prohibitively small sample size. Results for married filers, shown in the first two columns of Table 3 , reveal that a reduction in the PDV of future tax benefits resulting from the rule change increases the probability of exit from a small business. The magnitude of this effect is rather large, indicating that a $100 reduction in the PDV as a result of switching from ACRS to MACRS (represented by a one-unit or $100 increase in the difference 11 The significant and negative effect of Missing Region indicates that high-AGI returns (i.e., those with AGI over $200,000) are less likely to exit an entrepreneurial activity.
variable used in the model) leads to an increase in the probability of exit of about 1.7 percentage points. Given the average exit probability of 16.5 percent, this represents a 10.3 percent increase in the probability of exit. However, the result is only significant at the 10 percent level for 3-year properties. These results should be viewed with caution because in the cross-section we cannot control for individual-specific effects. Thus, unobservable factors (education, ability, industry) that are correlated with tax rates and exit rates could be affecting the result.
Perhaps as a result of the smaller sample size, patterns of significance among the other variables in the cross section results in Table 3 are quite different from the panel results in Table   2 . A number of coefficients that were statistically different from zero in the panel models are no longer statistically significant in the 1986-1987 cross section, including the entrepreneurship tax rate, the age 65 dummy, and the region dummies. Conversely, the number of dependent children at home and the total number of exemptions are statistically significant in the cross-section model but not in the panel model. Other results are largely unchanged from the panel results in Table 2 .
As a final sensitivity analysis in our discrete-choice framework, we limit the [1986] [1987] cross-sectional analysis to filers who reported depreciation deductions in 1986. Perhaps the overall results in Table 2 and the first two columns of Table 3 are driven by underlying trends in longevity among smaller small businesses who do not even report depreciation deductions. Our focus on 1986 claimants is intended to reveal whether those most likely to benefit from more attractive depreciation rules actually behave in the expected manner (i.e., if increasing the PDV of tax benefits from depreciation might lead to increased longevity).
Results from this exercise are shown in the third and fourth columns of Table 3 . Perhaps due to a significant reduction in sample size, only one of the included variables is found to have a statistically significant effect (mortgage interest deduction). It is important to note that even when focusing our analysis on those most likely to benefit from more attractive depreciation policies, we are still unable to find any evidence of a positive effect on longevity. Indeed, signs are still positive but coefficients are not statistically different from zero. In other words, increasing the PDV of tax benefits from depreciation allowances has no discernible effect on the probability of staying in a Schedule C sole proprietorship among those who reported depreciation deductions in 1986.
We now turn to survival analysis of small business spells, results of which are presented in Table 4 . 12 Table entries for single filers by about two percent, mirroring our discrete choice results in Table 2 . The time ratios on the PDV variable for married filers are slightly greater than one, but we cannot reject the null of no effect at standard levels of significance. This difference in the results for married filers might be due to our efforts to avoid problems due to gaps in the panel of data by restricting the analysis to filers who were in the panel for all twelve years and did not change filing status (single vs. married).
12 All survival-time models in this paper were estimated with the Stata (version 8 or later) statistical software, which permits the researcher to consider a multitude of distributional assumptions as well as the usual controls for censored data and unobserved heterogeneity. For additional information on these and other methods, interested readers should consult Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez (2002) , Gutierrez (2002) , Greene (2000) or Kiefer (1988) . Note that in this estimation method, the analysis focuses on the first "failure" so that if a household has more than one exit from entrepreneurial activity, only the first exit is analyzed. This does not appear to be a significant restriction as the vast majority of households that exit entrepreneurship in the data exit only once (91.35 percent). 13 Based in the Akaike (1974) , the log logistic distribution with gamma frailty and the log normal distribution with gamma frailty were actually preferred for single and married filers, respectively but the results were almost identical where an increase in the wage MTR increases the length of time in business and an increase in the entrepreneurial MTR has the opposite effect. However, it is interesting to note that the magnitude of the effect on the entrepreneurial tax rate is much smaller with the inclusion of the depreciation variable (21.0 percent versus 32.5 percent for single filers and 18.7 versus 44.8 percent for married filers). Thus, depreciation policy seems to have an independent effect outside of the effects on tax rates and that excluding this variable might have created an omitted variables problem in the earlier work.
Most of the time ratio coefficients on remaining covariates are not significantly different from 1.0 for single filers, presumably due to the small sample size. Married filers with age 65
exemptions, a mortgage interest deduction, or more dependent children have shorter entrepreneurial spells. Those living in regions other than the south and those with more total exemptions have longer entrepreneurial spells.
In sum, the results highlight the importance of data and specification issues. The discrete choice results presented in Table 2 suggest that increases in the PDV of tax reductions from depreciation (e.g. depreciating more of the value earlier in the recovery period) lead to higher probabilities of exit for small businesses owned by single and married filers. The effect is much larger for single filers (4.3 percent) than married filers (0.6 percent). Additional analysis confirms this result for single filers but not for married filers. The clear theme across all of these results is that throughout our analysis of the 1979-1990 tax return panel, we are unable to find evidence that favorable depreciation rules are linked to greater rates of entrepreneurial longevity among Schedule C sole proprietors.
to those from the log normal distribution, which we chose to present for comparisons to the earlier literature.
Conclusions
Researchers would treat all business purchases as current expenses. These changes would be direct extensions of recent increases in Section 179 limits and depreciation acceleration in general.
While such proposed changes may well be beyond the variation in our data, our results suggest that they could lead to reduced longevity for single filers but might have little effect on exit rates of married filers. The extent to which these exits represent business failures, sales of businesses to investors, or incorporation cannot be determined from our data, but should be explored in future research. Given the recent findings of Gurley and Bruce (2005) , it is possible that replacing the targeted tax breaks inherent in the favorable depreciation policies with a more general revenue-neutral reduction in marginal tax rates could provide more meaningful benefits to a much broader set of small businesses. 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Single Married *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. The dummy for Missing Region was dropped from the models due to perfect collinearity. 
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